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In a former paper [Fluct. Noise Lett., 13 (2014) 1450020] we introduced a vehicular communi-
cation system with unconditionally secure key exchange based on the Kirch-
hoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution scheme. In this paper, we address the secure 
KLJN key donation to vehicles. This KLJN key donation solution is performed lane-by-lane by 
using roadside key provider equipment embedded in the pavement. A method to compute the 
lifetime of the KLJN key is also given. This key lifetime depends on the car density and gives an 
upper limit of the lifetime of the KLJN key for vehicular communication networks. 
Keywords: Security; Vehicular Communication Networks; Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise 
(KLJN); Unconditional Security. 
1. Introduction 
After more than 100 years of development on modern vehicle technology, we are on 
our way to smarter cars and much more intelligent transportation systems. Nowadays, 
people pay more attention to safety and comfort in vehicles, rather than traditional 
traction ability, fuel cost, handling, and stability. Therefore, it is believed that safety 
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and mobility information such as road and traffic information (e.g. emergency braking, 
vehicle collision, congestion, toll collection, etc.), weather forecast warnings (e.g. 
water or ice on the pavement), and local services (e.g. route maps, gas or restaurant 
locations, etc.)[1–4] should be collected and provided to drivers and passengers in the 
vehicle.  
1.1. Vehicular Communication Networks  
Vehicular communication networks have become a reasonable intelligent transporta-
tion solution that can satisfy these demands effectively. A typical vehicular commu-
nication network is shown in Fig. 1[1, 5–9]. 
 
Fig. 1. A typical vehicular communication network. Three basic nodes are encountered in this type of net-
work: Vehicles, Roadside Devices (RSDs) and Certification Authorities (CAs). The types of communication 
within vehicular communication networks include [1, 5–9]: Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehi-
cle-to-Roadside-Device (V2RSD), and Vehicle-to-Certification-Authority (V2CA). 
 As summarized in previous publications [1, 5–9], Vehicles, Roadside Devices 
(RSDs), and Certification Authorities (CAs) are the three basic nodes in most of ve-
hicular communication networks. Vehicles are mobile terminal nodes that are in charge 
of collecting road and traffic information, reporting events to the CAs through the 
RSDs, and exchanging warnings with nearby vehicles. The RSDs are intermediate 
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nodes in charge of transferring messages between vehicles and CAs in two-ways. The 
CAs are the host nodes that manage information related to vehicles. These nodes also 
generate secure keys and provide certifications for all vehicles in the network, control 
message exchanges of the whole network, and distribute local information obtained 
outside the local vehicular communication network. Accordingly, the types of com-
munication within vehicular communication networks include [1, 5–9]: Vehi-
cle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Roadside-Device (V2RSD), and Vehi-
cle-to-Certification-Authority (V2CA). Communications within vehicular communi-
cation networks raise concerns for security and privacy. For example, the identity of 
vehicles, emergency braking, and vehicle collision warnings among vehicles must be 
transmitted securely to avoid malicious activities. The private financial information 
used in toll collection when cars pass by RSDs also needs to be protected. 
In order to solve these fundamental security-related issues for promising vehicular 
communication network applications, several security protocols have been proposed by 
different researchers. In [10–11], the authors proposed a security infrastructure that is 
based on public key infrastructure (PKI). Later, other solutions based on PKI were 
proposed [2, 4, 12, 13]. The authors of [2] provided a “lightweight” authenticated key 
scheme that integrates blind signature techniques for V2V and V2RSD communica-
tions. In [4], the authors presented an approach that combines the traditional PKI and 
identity-based public key cryptography for vehicular communication networks. In [12], 
a secure scheme with session keys (pairwise and group keys) used in non-safety-related 
applications (e.g. “chatting in platoon”) was designed. In [13], temporary anonymous 
certified keys (TACKs) were constructed, and a key management scheme based on 
TACKs was proposed for vehicular communication networks. Besides PKI, group 
signatures are another important category of proposed security methods. Based on the 
strong Diffie-Hellmanand linear assumptions, the authors of [14] introduced the un-
der-200 bytes group signature scheme that has a similar security level to the RSA 
(Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman public-key cryptosystem) signature of the same length. 
A group signature-based protocol using tamper-resistance devices and a probabilistic 
signature verification scheme was proposed in [3]. In [15], the authors constructed an 
identity-based batch verification scheme for V2RSD communication in vehicular 
communication networks. In [16], a software-based roadside unit-aided messages 
authentication protocol for V2V communications was proposed. In addition, a soft-
ware-based solution that uses secure and privacy enhancing communication schemes 
for vehicular sensor networks was provided in [17]. 
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Most of the above security schemes or protocols are constructed based on software 
encryption mechanisms. The security on these software-based methods is based on the 
premise that the eavesdroppers have limited computational power. Thus, these security 
schemes offer just a computationally conditional security [18–22]. Moreover, these 
architectures focus their attention on V2V or V2RSD communications and although 
there is significant information transmitted in the Road-
side-Device-to-Certification-Authority (RSD2CA) communication [9], it is very rare to 
find works related to securing this particular communication channel. 
In [9], a novel unconditionally secure vehicular communication architecture that 
utilizes the KLJN key distribution scheme was proposed. In this architecture, a new 
node called the Roadside-Key-Provider (RSKP) was introduced to provide the cars 
with KLJN keys. Based on this work, we discuss the KLJN-based secure key genera-
tion, donation, and lifetime in vehicular communication networks. The remainder of 
this paper is organized as follows. In section 2.1, we discuss the key generation process 
in vehicular networks by describing the message exchange and specifying the different 
network lines used during the process. In section 2.1, we propose a lane-by-lane KLJN 
key donation solution for the vehicular communication architecture with uncondition-
ally secure key exchange proposed in [9]. An upper limit for the KLJN key lifetime in 
vehicular communication networks is computed in section 2.3. The results are 
demonstrated with practical considerations. Section 3 concludes the paper.  
1.2. On the KLJN key exchange 
The illustration of the ideal KLJN key exchange scheme is shown in Fig. 2 [19, 21–24].  
 
Fig. 2. Illustration of the ideal KLJN key distribution scheme. There is a switch and identical pairs of resistors 
(𝑅𝐿 and 𝑅𝐻, 𝑅𝐿 ≠ 𝑅𝐻) on each communicator (referred to as Alice and Bob) side, where RL represents the 
low, 𝐿 bits , RH represents the high, 𝐻 bits; 𝑢𝐿,𝐴(𝑡), 𝑢𝐻,𝐴(𝑡) and 𝑢𝐿,𝐵(𝑡), 𝑢𝐻,𝐵(𝑡) are the thermal (Johnson) 
noise voltages (Gaussian noise voltage generators) at temperature 𝑇𝑒𝑓𝑓 of RL and RH of Alice and Bob, 
respectively, 𝑢𝑐(𝑡) is the channel noise voltage, and 𝑖𝑐(𝑡) is the noise current in the wire. 
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The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme was 
proposed in 2005 [19] as a statistical/physical competitor to quantum key distribution 
(QKD) [20]. The KLJN scheme provides unconditional security based on the Kirch-
hoff’s loop law of quasi-static electrodynamics and the fluctuation-dissipation theorem 
[19, 21–24]; for a general security proof, see [25]. Several potential applications have 
been proposed such as: classical networks [26], smart power grids [27], and secure 
computers, algorithms, and hardware [28].  
In this ideal KLJN scheme, the two communicating parties, Alice and Bob, 
communicate via a wireline channel. There is a switch and identical pairs of resistors 
(𝑅𝐿 and 𝑅𝐻, 𝑅𝐿 ≠ 𝑅𝐻) on each communicator side, where 𝑅𝐿 represents the low, 𝐿 bit 
and 𝑅𝐻  represents the high, 𝐻  bit. The Gaussian noise voltage generators 𝑢𝐿,𝐴(𝑡) , 
𝑢𝐻,𝐴(𝑡) and 𝑢𝐿,𝐵(𝑡), 𝑢𝐻,𝐵(𝑡) represent the enhanced thermal (Johnson) noise voltages 
at temperature 𝑇𝑒𝑓𝑓 of 𝑅𝐿 and 𝑅𝐻 of Alice and Bob, respectively, while the 𝑢𝑐(𝑡) is the 
channel noise voltage, and the 𝑖𝑐(𝑡) is the noise current in the wire. At the beginning of 
the bit sharing period, both Alice and Bob randomly choose one of the resistors (𝑅𝐿 or 
𝑅𝐻 ) and the corresponding Gaussian noise voltage generator ( 𝑢𝐿,𝐴(𝑡)  or 𝑢𝐻,𝐴(𝑡) , 
𝑢𝐿,𝐵(𝑡) or 𝑢𝐻,𝐵(𝑡), respectively) and connect them to the wireline. The possible per-
mutations of the resistors connected to the channel will be: 𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐻, 𝐻𝐿, and 𝐻𝐻. In the 
cases of 𝐿𝐿 or 𝐻𝐻, the location of the resistors and the exchanged bits are publicly 
known, thus these bits are discarded [19]. On the other hand, 𝐿𝐻 and 𝐻𝐿 are secure bit 
exchange situations, because Eve cannot differentiate between the situations 𝐿𝐻 and 
𝐻𝐿.  
The security of the ideal KLJN scheme is based on the second law of thermody-
namics [19, 21–24], that is the difficulty to crack the ideal KLJN system is similar to 
that of to build a perpetual-motion machine of the second kind. In addition, the KLJN 
system is robust and not sensitive to vibrations [24], and is easy to be integrated on 
chips [28]. Based on the above core scheme, some advanced schemes were proposed to 
enhance the speed of the KLJN system [23]. 
In order to protect against active (invasive) attacks (and also against passive at-
tacks on non-ideal systems), the KLJN system continuously monitors or measures the 
instantaneous current and voltage at the two ends of the line [22]. These measurements 
are compared via an authenticated public channel. Therefore, any intruder causing 
changes in the circuitry, and thus affecting the instantaneous measurements, will cause 
an alarm to go off and Alice and Bob will discover the intrusion. This defense mecha-
nism is illustrated in Fig. 3.  
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Fig. 3. KLJN system protection against invasive (active) attacks. Alice and Bob measure the instantaneous 
channel voltage and current amplitudes and compare them via an authenticated public channel. Alice and 
Bob learn all the information Eve can have. Additional elements to prevent hacking—such as line filters, line 
capacitance killer arrangement, etc.—are not shown. The notation is the same as in Fig. 2. 
 
It is important to note that the instantaneous current and voltage data contain all the 
information related to the key that Eve could have. Thus, it is impossible for Eve to 
extract key information without letting the system know of such activity. In conse-
quence, Alice and Bob can decide whether or not to discard the compromised bits 
according to a previously agreed maximum allowed level of information leak toward 
Eve [22].  
According to the working principle of the KLJN scheme, the secure bit exchange 
takes place when the resistor states of the two communicators (i.e., the CA and RSD 
and/or RSKP in vehicular communication networks) are different, i.e., 𝐿𝐻 or 𝐻𝐿 .This 
is indicated by an intermediate level of the mean-square noise voltage (𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑛) on the 
line, or that of the noise current in the wire [19]. This concept is shown in Fig. 4.  
 
 
Fig. 4. The secure bit generation in the KLJN scheme. The intermediate mean-square noise level represent the 
bit situations 𝐿𝐻 or 𝐻𝐿, that is when a secure bit exchange takes place. 
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It is important to mention that the two communication parties must previously and 
publicly agree on which one of them will invert the exchanged bit to have identical keys 
at the two ends. 
2. KLJN Secure Key in Vehicular Communication Networks 
Based on the working principle of the KLJN scheme [19] and the vehicular commu-
nication network model with unconditional secure key exchange proposed in [9], we 
discuss the generation, donation, and lifetime of the KLJN secure key in vehicular 
communication networks. 
2.1. KLJN key generation in vehicular communication networks 
According to the vehicular communication network model with unconditional secure 
key distribution proposed in [9], there is a KLJN line connecting the Certification 
Authority (CA) to the Roadside Devices (RSDs) and Roadside Key Providers (RSKP) 
(see Fig. 5). 
 
Fig. 5. Vehicular communication networks with unconditional secure key exchange. The network nodes 
remain the same except for a new node: the roadside key provider (RSKP) and extra wires for KLJN key 
exchange between the CA and RSD and/or RSKP. The existing wirelines between the RSDs/RSKPs and the 
CA are kept for high speed communication purposes. 
On KLJN-based secure key distribution in vehicular communication networks 
8 
 
The KLJN key generation process is performed as follows: 
i). When a vehicle needs a secure key, it sends a message (via wireless communi-
cation) to the closest RSKP with the key request.  
ii). The RSKP will use the extra wire (i.e., the high speed communication line) to 
inform the CA in charge about the key request.  
iii). A key generation process will take place between the RSKP and the CA.  
iv). The RSKP will then provide the cars with the unconditional secure keys by using 
a near field communication wireless technology [9].  
v). The RSDs also use their KLJN lines that connect them to the CA to generate 
KLJN keys that are used to secure the communication between RSDs and the CA. 
 
Note that the KLJN line is used only to secretly generate and share the KLJN keys 
that are going to be used to secure the communication between two nodes. The rest of 
the communication is done either via wireless communication or using a high speed 
communication wireline.  
2.2. KLJN key donation in vehicular communication networks 
It is important to mention that the RSKP key donation that was proposed in [9], where 
RSKPs were visualized as gates, might not be as efficient as expected. This is because 
vehicles would have to slow down in order to get sufficiently close to the RSKPs (as 
proximity is needed for secure key donation). Therefore, we also propose a 
lane-by-lane key donation using RSKP equipment embedded in the pavement. In this 
way, vehicles will not have to slow down to obtain their keys. To detect vehicles in 
each lane, either loop detectors [29] or high-definition digital wave radars [30] de-
ployed on the side of the roadway can be used. Both the RSKPs and the radar units can 
be connected to RSDs through a high speed wireline connection. Thus, the KLJN key 
generation is performed between RSDs and the CA only, while the RSKP will be only 
in charge of providing the cars with the unconditionally secure KLJN keys. Moreover, 
this key donation process would be encrypted with the former key, therefore, even if an 
eavesdropper is listening, he/she would not be able to extract the key information un-
less he/she has the former key. Figure 6 illustrates this solution. 
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Fig. 6. Key donation with RSKP equipment embedded in the pavement. RSKPs are located underground of 
each lane. 
 
2.3. Upper limit of the KLJN key lifetime 
The lifetime of the KLJN key in vehicular communication networks is a very important 
technical parameter that needs to be discussed. This is because the longer the KLJN key 
is used, the more susceptible it is to attacks. In order to find out the lifetime of the KLJN 
key in vehicular communication networks, we proceed as follows.  
 First of all, the noise bandwidth 𝐵𝐾𝐿𝐽𝑁  is determined by the distance 𝐿 between the 
two communicating parties, which in the case of vehicular communication networks 
depends on the length of the KLJN line segment between RSDs and the CA. Thus, the 
following relationship must be satisfied [19]: 𝐵𝐾𝐿𝐽𝑁 ≪
𝑐
𝐿
, where 𝑐 is the speed of elec-
tromagnetic waves in the wireline. Suppose that 0 < Θ ≪ 1 and the noise bandwidth 
is: 
 𝐵𝐾𝐿𝐽𝑁 = Θ
𝑐
𝐿
.           (1) 
 Also, the duration of the bit sharing period 𝜏 must be long enough compared to the 
correlation time  of the noise 𝜏𝐾𝐿𝐽𝑁, i.e., 𝜏𝐾𝐿𝐽𝑁 ≈
1
𝐵𝐾𝐿𝐽𝑁
, in order to correctly distinguish 
between the different resistors situations [31, 32]. The frequency of secure bit exchange 
is: 
 𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑐 =
1
2
𝐵𝐾𝐿𝐽𝑁
𝛾
,                (2) 
where 𝛾 ≫ 1, see [31, 32] and the factor 
1
2
 is due to the fact that a secure bit exchange 
occurs (on average) 50% of the time. 
 The lifetime of the KLJN key 𝜏𝑘 in vehicular communication networks depends on 
the vehicle density. For the sake of simplicity, first we assume homogenous car density: 
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 𝑛𝑐 =
𝑁𝑐
𝑁𝐾𝐿𝐽𝑁
,                   (3) 
where 𝑁𝑐 is the number of cars and 𝑁𝐾𝐿𝐽𝑁 is the number of Roadside Devices with 
KLJN units. Thus, a KLJN unit serves 𝑛𝑐 cars. Consequently, the frequency of secure 
bit donation to a single car is: 
 𝑓𝑐 =
𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑐
𝑛𝑐
 .                 (4) 
If the length of the KLJN key is defined as 𝑁𝑘, then by combining Eqs. (1)–(4), we find 
that the lifetime of the KLJN key in vehicular communication networks is: 
 𝜏𝑘 =
𝑁𝑘
𝑓𝑐
=
2𝑁𝑘𝑛𝑐𝛾𝐿
𝛩𝑐
.        (5) 
 Note that this result represents a pessimistic estimation for inhomogeneous ve-
hicular communication networks when 𝑛𝑐 is the upper limit of the number of cars any 
RSD is handling. Thus, Eq. (5) gives an upper limit of the lifetime of the KLJN key in 
vehicular communication networks. To demonstrate the results, we assign possible 
practical values to the parameters. Let 𝐿 = 1000 𝑚, 𝑐 = 2 ∗ 108 𝑚/s, γ = 100 (since 
𝛾 =
𝐵𝐾𝐿𝐽𝑁
𝑓𝐵
, where 𝑓𝐵 =
1
𝜏
 should be low enough compared to 𝐵𝐾𝐿𝐽𝑁 , see [30,31]), 
𝑁𝑘 = 100 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠, 𝑛𝑐 = 1000 𝑣𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠, and 𝛩 = 0.1 (in order to satisfy 𝐵𝐾𝐿𝐽𝑁 ≪
𝑐
𝐿
, that 
is the “no-wave limit” condition [22]). Then the lifetime of KLJN key is 𝜏𝑘 = 10
3 𝑠. 
 Techniques such as building parallel channels by using chip and multi-wire cables 
can be used to enhance the speed of the KLJN scheme and to decrease 𝜏𝑘 [19]. There is 
also a possibility to increase the security of physically exchanged keys in the case of 
repeated usage [33]. 
3. Conclusion 
In this paper, we reviewed the communication infrastructure and discussed some se-
curity-related aspects of vehicular communication networks. We have proposed a 
KLJN key donation solution for vehicular communication networks. The KLJN key 
generation in vehicular communication networks has also been discussed and an upper 
limit for the lifetime of this KLJN key was computed.  
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